

SOURCES USED FOR ICAF STUDY ON

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Chapter I. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

World War II Arrangements, pp. 2-3.

This material is all covered in Ransom's Central Intelligence and National Security, his pp. 58-60, and 68-71.

Post-War Changes, pp. 5-7.

The President's Executive Order of January 1945 and the National Security Act of 1947 (amended 1949) are of course unclassified. They are discussed by many writers, e.g., Ransom in his pp. 71-78.

The National Security Council, pp. 7-10.

The material in these pages draws on the Dillon Anderson article cited in the bibliography.

The Role of Intelligence in Policy Making, pp. 10-15.

For similar unclassified discussions on this subject see Ransom, his pp. 134, 172-174, and 201-205. See also Kent's Strategic Intelligence, his p. 201. See also Hilsman's remarks on "Intelligence and Policy" on pp. 113-118 of his Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions.

The Central Intelligence Agency, pp. 15-16.

Ransom discusses the Agency in greater detail on pp. 77-94 of his book. On p. 83, he notes CIA's clandestine operations. On p. 86, he refers to the monitoring of foreign broadcasts by CIA. On p. 132, he alludes to CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence. On pp. 34-35, he mentions CIA's central repositories of intelligence documents.

Roger Hilsman on p. 36 notes that CIA has set up offices for economic intelligence.

The United States Intelligence Board, pp. 17-21.

This material covers ground gone over in the unclassified literature on the intelligence community and on the USIB's predecessor organization, the IAC. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces text on Economic Warfare and Economic Intelligence gives the membership of the IAC on pp. 48-49. Ransom in his chapter V on "The Intelligence Community" discusses all the present members of the USIB, including the Office of Special Operations in the Department of Defense (p. 98) and NSA (pp. 116-118).

Standing Committees of the USIB, pp. 22-23.

The Scientific Estimates Committee, the Economic Intelligence Committee, and the National Intelligence Survey Committee are the only USIB standing committees discussed in this section. In addition, the Watch Committee is shown on the chart on p. 21 of the draft. With the exception of the Scientific Estimates Committee, these are all shown in Ransom's chart on his p. 139.

Note statement on p. 22 of draft in last paragraph, "CIA analysts produce most of the economic intelligence on the Communist bloc." This may go somewhat further than other unclassified literature in indicating CIA's economic intelligence activities.

Chapter II. THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

Preliminary paragraphs, pp. 24-25.

This material adapted from pp. 1-2 of the unclassified training study, Fundamentals of Intelligence.

Requirements, pp. 26-28.

Sherman Kent touches on this problem in his discussion of "The Problem of Guidance" (his pp. 180-184). He deals with the matter of communicating requirements to the field in his pp. 165-166. Fundamentals of Intelligence discusses collection guides and collection requirements on pp. 11-12.

Collection, pp. 39-57.

All the collection sources mentioned here except #9 are described in Fundamentals of Intelligence, pp. 18-17. #9 is taken from Barbara Tuchman's book, The Zimmermann Telegram, New York, Viking, 1941.

Ransom deals with collection in his pp. 15-16 and p. 37. Kent touches on the problem on p. 186. The letter-number rating system is described in NCAY's book on Economic Warfare and Economic Intelligence, p. 32.

Information Processing, pp. 37-39.

This material obtained in interview with DAD of OCR and understood to be unclassified. Ransom also describes the process, with mention of electronic devices, on his pp. 34-35.

Analysis, pp. 39-47.

Fundamentals of Intelligence (pp. 5, 18, and 20-27) fully describes the analysis stage of the intelligence process.

Dissemination, pp. 47-48.

This material, except for the last paragraph, is taken from Fundamentals of Intelligence (pp. 27-28). Kent touches on the subject in his pp. 117-138.

Source for last paragraph is the indicated congressional report. Ransom also touches on this point on his p. 42.

Chapter III. CATEGORIES OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

The Strategic Estimate

Defining the Problem, pp. 64-65.

The specific points in this section fall within Sherman Kent's broad categories of what intelligence has to know about Great Powers (his pp. 44-45). Ransom on his p. 134 describes the netting up of terms of reference as one of the first steps in producing the NIE.

Intelligence Estimates. pp. 85.

There is no comment is made in the draft to Mr. Kent for this collective phrase.

Intelligence and Capabilities. pp. 86-88.

This section deals with probable outcome of action as influenced by intentions and limited by capabilities. This literature of intelligence is replete with philosophizing on this subject. See for example Glavin in his pp. 40-41, 87, 114. See also Kent in his pp. 89-94.

Production Procedures. pp. 89-92.

Ransom deals with this subject in his section on "producing National Estimates" (pp. 134-137). He also discusses the problem of intelligence by conference and the question of dissents (pp. 196-197). He alludes to post-mortems on p. 291.

Current Intelligence Reports

Introductory paragraphs. pp. 93-98.

The description of forms of current intelligence (oral briefings, written publications, etc.) seemed to the writer to be fairly obvious points which did not raise questions of security classification. Ransom mentions daily intelligence digests and weekly summaries on his p. 200. He speaks of "crash" estimates on his p. 137.

The Current Intelligence Analyst. pp. 98-99.

Bilman on his pp. 103-113 touches on the differences between current intelligence analysis and other intelligence analysts. On page 11, he mentions the working against deadlines that characterizes current intelligence. On p. 109, he speaks of the analyst's function of "analyzing, communicating, and making predictions about the future possibilities of current world developments."

Past Failures of Current Intelligence, pp. 69-71.

The material in this section is historical and available in open literature. Par. 1, for example, was drawn from Rumsen's The Future of American Secret Intelligence, p. 8. Peters also provides background for the paragraph on Pearl Harbor (his pp. 4-7). The US Congressional Joint Committee (Item 18 of bibliography) covered the same ground, with the same conclusions.

Indications Analysis, pp. 71-73.

Official government documents on Pearl Harbor allude to indications of imminent hostilities, e.g., instructions to burn codes. Ransom on his pp. 33-34 describes the importance of developing "a very elaborate set of indicators (his italics) which permit the operation of an efficient forecasting or warning system." He goes on to cite specific indicators (mobilization of troops in Russia, revision of Russian secret codes, etc.). He also states that indicators must not be considered in isolation but in conjunction with other background evidence.

The Watch Committee and National Indications Center, pp. 73-75.

Ransom's section on "The Watch Committee and Indications Center" can be found on his p. 140.

Basic Surveys

Introductory paragraphs, pp. 76-80.

The story of Tarawa is taken from pp. 27-28 and 31-34 of Crowl and Lowe, Seizure of the Gilbert and Marshalls, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, published by the Department of the Army in 1953.

The rest of the section up through p. 78 is drawn from Kent's pp. 12, 22-26. P. 30 is based on interview with DAD of OCB.

JAMES in World War II, pp. 41-42.

This information was drawn from an excerpt (provided by AD of CIO of State Department) of testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, 86th Congress, first year 1960.

The National Intelligence Survey, pp. 22-23.

Rusconi pretty much covers this ground on his p. 103.

Chapter IV. SUBJECT MATTER SPECIALIZATION

Political Intelligence, pp. 44-52.

The draft deals with the obvious fields that concern the political analyst in the academic or intelligence world. Kent touches on the subject in his pp. 38-37.

Biographical Intelligence, pp. 33-36.

Kent describes intelligence on personalities in his pp. 32-33 and 140-143. Chapter 2, Section IX, "Biographical Intelligence" of U. S. Army Strategic Intelligence School manual on Strategic Intelligence is unclassified.

Military Intelligence, pp. 31-33.

The draft describes the range of subjects obviously with the purview of a military analyst, whether he is Hanson Baldwin or an intelligence officer. Kent describes the scope of military intelligence on his pp. 33-34. Chapter 2, Section II, "Military Geography" of U. S. Army Strategic Intelligence School manual on Strategic Intelligence is unclassified.

Scientific Intelligence, pp. 94-101.

Introductory paragraphs, pp. 94-96.

The draft draws on Jones' articles on "Scientific Intelligence" (see bibliography) and Book 1, Chapter 4, "The Wizard War" of Winston Churchill's Their Finest Hour.

Sources of Information, pp. 96-98.

It is presumed that no questions of classification attach to the description of overt sources. It is hoped that this is true also of the wording of the paragraph on May Day fly-bys on page 97 of the draft. Jones discusses sources of information in his pp. 347-348.

This last paragraph of this section is taken from U.S. CIA A/3007, 28 Aug 1958, Report of the Special Committee to Report to Study the Possibility of Limiting the Use of Nuclear Weapons in War, Report on the Possibility of a Possible Arrangement on the Use of Nuclear Weapons in War.

Personnel, pp. 68-70.

This material is also drawn from the same source. See for example his pp. 342 and 352.

Analysis, pp. 99-101.

Statements on radioactive debris taken from U.S. Report cited above, p. G. Jones on his p. 343 makes clear the advantages of agent reports and other standard sources.

Economic Intelligence

Introductory paragraphs, pp. 102-103.

These paragraphs draw on unclassified lectures before Industrial College by Klaus Knorr, "The Concept of Economic Potential for War," L-57-122, 18 March 1957.

Analysis of War Potential, pp. 103-111.

The economic elements in war potential are discussed in fuller detail by Klaus Knorr in his pp. 163-194 of The War Potential of Nations.

Wartime Economic Intelligence, pp. 114-117.

Kent describes target selection for air bombardment in his pp. 17-19. The story of the Hamburg air bombardment is taken from Chapter 12 of Gilbreath's The Attacker Society. (Gilbreath was a director of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey.) The factory markings paragraphs are taken from the Ruggles and Brodie article (Item 14 of bibliography).

Intelligence for Economic Warfare, pp. 118-120.

This material is drawn from pp. 8-14 of the Industrial College that on Economic Warfare and Economic Intelligence.

Economic Intelligence in the Cold War, pp. 100-102.

What is described in the context of economic analysis on the Communist challenge in the cold war as it appears in newspapers, magazines and other articles, as well as in intelligence publications.

Chapter V. INTELLIGENCE IN THE SPACE AGE, pp. 123-137.

Descriptions of DEW and SAGE have appeared in press and other unclassified articles. See for example "SAGE" in July - August 1958 issue of WE Magazine, published by Western Electric Company, pp. 32-34.

Possibilities of reconnaissance by earth satellites mentioned often in press. See for example Washington Post 27 March 1958, p. A-14, which gives text of report on space science technology by President's Science Advisory Committee, headed by James R. Killian.

Illustrations of machine translation given in J. Gen. Chem. 22, 1479 (1952) as provided in interview with DAD of OCR.

Gaming and simulation techniques fully described in operations research literature. Status of current research using these techniques in defense applications described in unclassified pamphlet "Better Management Through Logistics Research" published by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (S&L) November 1958.